




For a club such as the European Union, an important question is when,
and under which conditions, a subset of the members should be allowed to
form "inner clubs" and enhance cooperation. Flexible cooperation allows
members to participate if and only if they beneﬁt, but it generates a free-
rider problem if potential members choose to opt out. The analysis shows
that ﬂexible cooperation is better if the heterogeneity is large and the ex-
ternality small. The best possible symmetric and monotonic participation
mechanism, however, is implemented by two thresholds: A mandatory and
a minimum participation rule. Rigid and ﬂexible cooperation are both spe-
cial cases of this mechanism. For each of these thresholds, the optimum is
characterized.
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The future of the European Union is in disarray. After years of negotiations, the
members ﬁnally agreed at June 18, 2004, on a Constitution for Europe, deﬁning
new rules for how to make collective decisions. Since some countries must ratify
the constitution by referendums, it is currently uncertain whether it ever will be
implemented. If not, it is quite likely that a core group of countries proceed with
deeper integration alone, leaving out a periphery set of members at the status quo.
Critiques argue that this will lead to a dissolution of the EU at worst, or a division
between ﬁrst-rate and second-rate citizens at best. Supporters, however, argue
that such an approach is the only way of solving the conﬂict between enlargement
and deepening cooperation (discussed by e.g. Alesina, Angeloni and Etro, 2001).
This idea is not new. Dewatripont et al. (1995) argues in favor of such "ﬂexible
integration", deﬁned by a "common base" in which all members must participate,
and "open partnerships" where subsets of countries may cooperate additionally.
T h ec o m m o nm a r k e ts h o u l db eap a r to ft h ec o m m o nb a s e ,w h i l et h ec u r r e n c y
union is a prime example of open partnership.
Whether a subset of a club should be allowed to form "inner clubs" is a general
problem, not limited to the European example. The advantage of such ﬂexibility
is that participation can be limited to those and only those that beneﬁtf r o m
this. However, if a country’s participation has positive externalities on other
participants or non-participants, then a free-rider problem arises in which too few
members will join the inner club.
This paper analyses whether such ﬂexible integration is indeed better than
traditional non-ﬂexible integration, where all or none of the members participate.
2I present a simple model with linear payoﬀ functions. A country may beneﬁt
from participating in the inner club, and its participation may aﬀect other par-
ticipants. The members that do not participate may also be aﬀected by the inner
club, though their beneﬁt may be smaller if the inner club is e.g. providing and
excludible public. I ﬁnd that ﬂexible integration is better than non-ﬂexible inte-
gration if and only if the heterogeneity is large, the externality small, and if the
outsiders cannot easily be excluded.
Both ﬂexible and non-ﬂexible integration are special cases of a more general
mechanism. If the participation mechanism, a mapping from the set of votes to the
set of participants, must be symmetric and monotonic, then it is always deﬁned by
two boundaries m and m,w h e r em ≤ m. If less than m wants to participate, then
the inner club should be prohibited. If, on the other hand, more than m wants
to participate, then all members should be obligated to. Participation should be
voluntary only if the number of participants is strictly between these boundaries.
Such boundaries are indeed observed in reality. The Kyoto protocol, for example,
was only valid if at least 55% of the polluters ended up ratifying the treaty. If
Russia, then, had chosen not to ratify the treaty, the Kyoto protocol would be
invalid according to these rules, and this made Russia pivotal in implementing the
treaty for all participants. In this way, the "mandatory participation rule" at 55%
could to some extend reduce the free-rider problem among potential participants.
Similarly, the "minimum participation rule" m forces everyone to participate in a
situation where the incentive to free-ride is extremely large (i.e. when most other
members do participate). The analysis shows that if the heterogeneity is small
and the externality large, then m should increase and m decrease.
Minimumparticipation rules are common, particularly for environmental agree-
3ments. Barrett (2003) lists 297 environmental treaties, where only 9 do not specify
a minimum participation threshold. The Kyoto protocol, for example, was valid
only if at least 55% of the polluters ended up ratifying the treaty. If Russia, then,
had chosen not to ratify the treaty, the Kyoto protocol would be invalid according
to the rules. Russia was thus pivotal for implementing the treaty, and unable to
free-ride on the other participants.
R e t u r n i n gt ot h eE u r o p e a nU n i o n ,i t sc u r rent Treaty (Article 43) does lay out
conditions for when "enhanced cooperation" is allowed. The subgroup should, for
example, be open to all and respect the rights of non-participants. The subgroup
must also include at least eight member states. Moreover, for most types of
policies, mandatory participation is attained if supported by a qualiﬁed majority.
Thus, the functioning of the EU is indeed characterized by a pair of mandatory
and minimum participation rules.
The literature comparing ﬂexible and rigid cooperation is small. Dewatripont
et al. (1995) argue in favor of more "ﬂexible integration", deﬁned by a "common
base" in which all members must participate, and "open partnerships" where
o n l yas u b s e tp a r t i c i p a t e s .T h ei n t e r n a lm a r k e ts h o u l db eap a r to ft h ec o m m o n
base, while the currency union should be an open partnership. Thygesen (1997)
suggests the opposite, and claims that some asymmetry and discrimination may
be necessary in order to encourage more members to participate. Berglöf et al.
(2006), on the other hand, argue that the possibility to form open partnerships
may be exactly what motivates outsiders to join, since they are assumed to suﬀer
by a negative externality otherwise. Bordignon and Brusco (2006) provide one
of the few formal analysis on whether ﬂexible is better than rigid integration.
The problem with ﬂexible integration is, they argue, that the participants may
4coordinate on standards that do not take into account the utility of outsiders and
future potential members. Only if they can commit on a standard taking these
preferences into account should ﬂexible integration be allowed. This paper, in
contrast, takes free-riding to be the major drawback of ﬂexible integration. Rigid
cooperation is an extreme way of dealing with this problem; deﬁning mandatory
and minimum participation rules is generally better.1
There are just a few papers on mandatory participation rules, or "federal man-
dates". Crémer and Palfrey (2000, 2006) argue that such mandates are too strict
in the political equilibrium. The intuition is related to the one provided in this
model. With its focus on majority thresholds, this paper also contributes to the
large literature on majority rules, including e.g. Buchanan and Tullock (1962),
Aghion and Bolton (2003), Gersbach and Erlenmaier (2001), and Harstad (2005).
These papers assume that some kind of side transfers between the members is
possible. Elsewhere (Harstad, 2006), I have argued that the members may want
to prohibit side transfers since these could lead to conﬂicts and delay when pref-
erences are private information. Thus, this paper abstracts from side payments,
although information is complete. A super-majority rule, in this context, is opti-
mal if and only if no members are prohibited from participating in inner clubs.
The literature on minimum participation rules is small as well. With a ﬁnite
number of members, Black et al. (1993) estimate the eﬀect of the rule by numer-
ical simulations, while Rutz (2001) assumes all members to be identical. Both
contributions take the rule as exogenously given and predict that it will bind in
1The paper is also related to the large literature on whether regional trade agreements are
a stepping stone or a stumbling block for global free trade (see e.g. Bhagwati, 1991 and 1993,
Burbidge et al., 1997, and Aghion et al., 2006).
5equilibrium. This paper, however, allows for aggregate shocks and, then, the rule
may not bind. Also Carraro et al. (2004) endogenize the rule, but they abstract
from heterogeneity and aggregate shocks. Barrett (2003) summarizes some of
this literature, and suggests that the minimum participation rule may also be a
coordination device.
The next section presents the very simple model. Section 3 employs the model
to study ﬂexible and non-ﬂexible integration, it shows that each is ﬁrst-best only
in very special cases, and derives conditions which can be used to select the best
rule. Section 4 shows that if the participation mechanism must be symmetric and
monotonic, then it is characterized by the two thresholds m and m. The following
subsections ﬁnd that m should increase and m decrease if the heterogeneity is
small and the externalities large. Since the analysis is only a ﬁr s ta t t e m p tt o
study such rules, it hinges on several restrictive assumptions. The EU Treaty, as
discussed in Section 5, is indeed characterized by these two thresholds. The ﬁnal
section concludes.
2. A Simple Model
Consider a club with a set of members I. Some of these may form an inner club
to deepen integration or implement an additional project. This may have beneﬁts
as well as costs, and, in isolation, the net value to member i ∈ I is drawn to be
vi = v −  i − θ,
where  i and θ are some individual and aggregate shocks, respectively. The  is
are independently drawn from a uniform distribution with mean zero and density
61/h:










To simplify, let there be a continuum of members, I ≡ [0,1], such that the distri-
bution of the  is is deterministic and uniform on [−h/2,h/2]. Then, h measures
the ex post heterogeneity in values. If we order the is according to increasing  is,
then vi = v + h/2 − hi − θ.
The state parameter θ is an aggregate shock which shifts all the individual












In "isolation", i would like to be a member if vi > 0.H o w e v e r , i is not
isolated. If i contributes to the project, then also the n other members beneﬁt
from i’s participation, and this beneﬁt, or "externality", is denoted e.M e m b e ri’s
participation may also be beneﬁcial to the mass 1 − n that does not participate,
and this beneﬁti sm e a s u r e db yq. If the members can exclude non-members to
some extent, then q<e .T h u s ,f o rag i v e nn, i’s value of participating is vi + en,
while if i does not participate, she earns qn.
I will assume that for some θ, the value of the project is so small that no-one
wants to participate (not even v0). Denote this critical value θ :
v + h/2 − θ =0 .
For a small enough θ,h o w e v e r ,e v e r y o n ew a n t st op a r t i c i p a t e( e v e nv1). Denote
this critical value θ :
v − h/2 − θ +( e − q)=0
7If θ > θ, then we typically have two equilibria where either everyone or no-one
wants to participate. The reason is that when more members participate, the
beneﬁt of becoming members of the inner club increases, and this outweights
the increased costs when more and more reluctant members join. To make the
problem interesting, assume that
h>e− q,






3. Flexible v Rigid Integration
Before analyzing the equilibrium, it is worthwhile to study the ﬁrst-best number
of participants. Clearly, if only n<1 participate, then the members should be
the set [0,n], since these are the one beneﬁting most. Throughout the analysis, I
will implicitly assume that these are the members actually participating.
Proposition 1: If (3.1) does not hold, then n =1is optimal if v + e − θ>0,
while n =0is optimal otherwise. Assuming (3.1) holds, the optimal n is given by
(3.2).
If h>2(e − q), then (3.1)
n∗ =
v + h/2 − θ + q
h − 2(e − q)
(3.2)
8if this n∗ ∈ [0,1].2
Proof: If n m e m b e r sj o i n ,t h es o c i a lv a l u ei s
n Z
0




= nv + nh/2 − hn
2/2 − θn+ en
2 + qn(1 − n)
= n(v + h/2 − θ + q) − n
2(h/2 − e + q). (3.3)
For small enough θ,t h eﬁrst parenthesis is positive and it is beneﬁcial that
some members contribute. If the second parenthesis is negative, h/2 − e + q<0,
then there is increasing returns to scale since the value of adding new members
increases faster than their marginal cost is increasing. Thus, (3.1) is the second-
order condition necessary for an interior n∗, which can be found by maximizing
(3.3) wrt n. QED
3.1. Rigid Integration
With rigid integration, I will mean that either everyone, or no-one, has to con-
tribute. Of these two alternatives, it is clearly better that all contribute if and
only if v + e − θ>0, which is equivalent to v1/2 + e ≥ 0, i.e. that the median
2More formally, this and similar expressions should be written as
n∗ =0 if
v + h/2 − θ + q
h − 2(e − q)
< 0
n∗ =
v + h/2 − θ + q
h − 2(e − q)
if
v + h/2 − θ + q
h − 2(e − q)
∈ [0,1]
n∗ =1 if
v + h/2 − θ + q
h − 2(e − q)
< 1.
9voter prefers integration. Thus, a simple majority rule implements the best binary
choice. Comparing with Proposition 1, we get the following result immediately:
Proposition 2: Under non-ﬂexible integration, the best majority rule is m =1 /2.
This is ﬁrst-best if and only if (3.1) does not hold, that is, if the heterogeneity h
is low and the externality e large. Otherwise, too many contribute if θ ≤ v + e,
while too few contribute for θ>v+ e.
A c c o r d i n gt oP r o p o s i t i o n1 ,t h eﬁrst-best requires that everyone or no-one
contributes if h<2(e − q), because then the spillover eﬀects on participants are
more important than the heterogeneity between the members. Naturally, this
outcome can be implemented by a majority rule. That the best majority rule is
m =1 /2 follows from the assumption that the  is are symmetrically distributed,
and it then follows from May’s Theorem.
3.2. Flexible Integration
If there is ﬂexible integration, then whoever wants to, becomes a member of the
club. Those who do not want to participate can abstain and perhaps free-ride
on the contributors. Naturally, these leads to too few participants whenever the
externalities are positive. If there are no externalities, such that e = q =0 ,t h e n
i’s participation only aﬀects i’s utility, and i’s decision of whether to participate,
is optimal.
Proposition 3: Under ﬂexible integration, the number of participants nF is given
by (3.4). Thus, if e = q =0 , nF = n∗.B u tnF <n ∗ if e ≥ q ≥ 0 with at least one
10strict inequality.
nF =
v + h/2 − θ
h − (e − q)
if ∈ [0,1]. (3.4)
Proof: Anticipating n (or taking n as given), i becomes a member if
vi + n(e − q) > 0
The marginal member, nF, is then willing to join if
v + h/2 − hn − θ + n(e − q) ≥ 0 ⇒ (3.4)
It is simple to compare nF and n∗ to verify Proposition 1. QED
3.3. Flexible or Rigid Integration?
While ﬂexible integration may lead to free-riding and too few participants, non-
ﬂexible integration treats everyone the same no matter whether they beneﬁto r
lose from further integration. It is thus important to study which is better.
Proposition 4: Flexible integration is better than non-ﬂexible integration if and
only if (3.6) holds, which is more likely if h is large, e small and q large.
Proof: From (3.3) and (3.4), we can easily calculate the welfare under ﬂexible
integration:
nF(v + h/2 − θ + q) − n
2
F(h/2 − e + q)
=
µ
v + h/2 − θ
h − (e − q)
¶
(v + h/2 − θ + q) −
µ
v + h/2 − θ
h − (e − q)
¶2
(h/2 − e + q)
=
µ
v + h/2 − θ




v + h/2 − θ
h − (e − q)
¶2
h/2. (3.5)
11For θ ≤ θ, n =1whether integration is ﬂexible or not, so we only need to








(v + h/2 − θ)
2 −
¡
v + h/2 − θ
¢2i




(v + h/2 − θ)
3 −
¡
v + h/2 − θ
¢3i
6σ(h − e + q)
2
=
q(h − e + q)
2
2σ(h − e + q)
+
h(h − e + q)
3
6σ(h − e + q)
2
=( h − e + q)(3q + h)/6σ
For non-ﬂexible integration, under the optimal majority rule m =1 /2,w e l f a r e
is v+e−θ whenever θ ≤ v+e, otherwise welfare is zero. Integrating welfare from
θ = θ to v + e gives:






=( v + e)(h/2+q)/σ −
£
(v + e)
2 − (v − h/2+e − q)
2¤
/2σ
=( v + e)(h/2+q)/σ −
£





Flexible is better than ﬁxed iﬀ
(h − e + q)(3q + h)/6σ>(h/2+q)
2 /2σ
(h − e + q)(3q + h) > 3(h/2+q)
2
h
2/4+hq > eh +3 qe
h(h +4 q)/4 >e (h +3 q) (3.6)
Suppose the inequality holds with equality. If then h increases, e decreases or q
increases marginally, then (3.6) holds. QED
12This result deserves some discussion. Quite intuitively, it says that if the
heterogeneity h is large, then ﬂexible integration is better than non-ﬂexible inte-
gration. The members are then too diﬀerent to require them all to do the same.
If the externality e is large, however, then ﬂexible integration leads to free-riding
and too few will participate in equilibrium. This means that it may be beneﬁ-
cial to force everyone to participate, even if the heterogeneity is positive. The
spillover eﬀect q on non-participants goes in the other direction, however. The
reason is roughly the following: Why a larger q does not aﬀect the utility under
non-ﬂexibility (there are then no outsiders), it increases the utility under ﬂexible
integration, since non-participants become better oﬀ.T h u s , ﬂexible integration
becomes relatively better.
It is worthwhile to notice that the expected value of participation, v,h a sn o
eﬀect on the optimal mechanism. The reason is simply that a larger v shifts
the critical θs up by the very same amount, whether integration is ﬂexible or
non-ﬂexible.
Above, I simply assumed that if integration were non-ﬂexible, then the ma-
jority rule were m =1 /2. In reality, a larger majority is often used in political
settings. Since m =1 /2 is optimal, a larger majority rule makes the non-ﬂexible
regime worse, and thus ﬂexibility relatively better.
Corollary 1: T h el a r g e ri st h em a j o r i t yr u l e ,t h eb e t t e ri sﬂexible compared
to non-ﬂexible integration.
134. The General Mechanism
In the language of mechanisms, ﬂexible cooperation is a mapping from i’s vote
wi ∈ {0,1},w h e r ewi =1indicates a "yes" for participation, to whether i should
participate, pi ∈ {0,1},w h e r epi =1indicates that i should participate. This
mechanism is simply pi = wi. Rigid integration, on the other hand, is a mapping
from the total number of yes-votes, w ≡ kwi p wi =1 k,t o{pi}i, and the mech-
anism can be stated as pi =1if and only if w ≥ m.I n g e n e r a l , w e m a y w a n t
a mechanism from both w and wi to pi ∈ {0,1}. Such a mechanism is, in fact,
always characterized by a pair (m,m),w h e r em ≥ m. Let |I| represent the number
of individuals. Then:
Proposition 5: If the participation mechanism M : {0,1}|I| → {0,1}|I| is sym-
metric and monotonic, then it is implemented by a pair (m,m),w h e r em ≥ m.
Proof: By "symmetric" I here mean that all members that vote the same, should
be treated similarly, and that a permutation of the wjs, j 6= i, should have no
eﬀect on pi.T h em e c h a n i s mM is a mapping from all the members’ votes to all
the members’ participation decision. Suppose vi =0 . Symmetry implies that
only the number of yes-votes determine whether i should participate, not their
identity. Monotonicity implies that there is a cut-oﬀ, such that if and only if the
14number of yes-votes is above this threshold, i should participate. Let m denote
this threshold. Similarly, there should be a threshold for the number of yes-votes
if vi =1 ,s u c ht h a ti should participate if the number of yes-votes is above this
threshold. Call this threshold m. Requiring M to be monotonic in vi as well,
m ≥ m. QED
Non-ﬂexible integration is a special case where m = m, while ﬂexible integra-
tion is another special case where m =0and m =1 .T h i ss e c t i o nﬁnds conditions
under which it is optimal to choose m > 0 and m<1, such that ﬂexible integration
is dominated by "semi-ﬂexible" integration.
4.1. When are m and m independent?
Clearly, the state parameter θ will determine the number of participants in equilib-
rium. If m and m are suﬃciently diﬀerent, there will exist θs where in equilibrium
everyone participate; n ∈ (m,m) participate; exactly m participate; and no-one
participates. Then, we can study the two choices of m and m in turn.
Proposition 6: If (4.1) holds, then (i) n as a function of θ looks like Figure 2,
(ii) the optimal m is independent of m,a n dv i s av e r s a . 3
(m − m)(h + q) >e(1 − m) (4.1)
3If (4.1) does not hold, the analysis would be very similar but more complicated. Since it
does not add much intuitively, and due to space and other constraints, analyzing this case is
b e y o n dt h es c o p eo ft h ep r e s e n tp a p e r .
15Proof: If θ is so small that m binds, i = m realizes that if she approves, everyone
is forced to. The critical θ, θ1,m a k e si indiﬀerent:
v + h/2 − mh − θ1 + e = qnF = q
µ
v + h/2 − θ1
h − e + q
¶
mh − e =
µ
h − e
h − e + q
¶
(v + h/2 − θ1) (4.2)
θ1 = v + h/2 − (mh − e)
µ
h − e + q
h − e
¶
For (4.2) to hold, mh − e>0. Welfare is then u1 = v + e − θ.
For a somewhat larger θ, less than m approves and only nF contribute. Welfare
is then (3.5), here deﬁned as u2.H o w e v e r ,f o ras u ﬃciently large θ = θ2, nF = m:
m(h − e + q)=v + h/2 − θ2
θ2 = v + h/2 − m(h − e + q).
16For θ such that nF <m , i ∈ (nF,m) realizes that she is pivotal for integration to
proceed. For the critical θ, θ3, the marginal member i = m is indiﬀerent:
v + h/2 − hm − θ3 + me =0⇒
θ3 = v + h/2 − m(h − e)
W e l f a r ei st h e n
u3 = mv + m
2e + m(1 − m)q − m(θ − h/2+hm/2)
= m(v + q + h/2 − θ) − m
2 (h/2 − e + q).


















By introspection, maximizing over m and m can proceed in steps. QED
4.2. Madatory Participation Rules
Let’s ﬁrst study the rule m.I fm o r et h a nm approves, everyone has to integrate. If
slightly less than m approves, only the approving members proceed. Since ﬂexible
integration leads to free-riding and too few members, the rule m may be good
since it forces free-riders to participate. However, if the heterogeneity is large,
then m implies that some members with very high costs are forced to participate.
W em a yt h u se x p e c tal o wm to be optimal if the externalities are large, while a
larger m is better when the heterogeneity is large. If q is small, outsiders beneﬁt
little and it is worthwhile to reduce m in order to make them participants and
thus beneﬁt. The following result shows that this intuition is indeed correct.
17Proposition 7: It is optimal to set m<1 and according to (4.4). Thus, m






− 2m =0 (4.4)
Proof: Since m only aﬀects θ1, it is worthwhile to increase m as long as u2 >u 1.
This implies:
µ
v + h/2 − θ1




v + h/2 − θ1
h − e + q
¶
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which clearly holds for small m, while it does not hold when m → 1.T h el e f t -
hand side is a u-shaped function in m which equals zero at m =0and at some
m ∈ (0,1) where the slope of the function is negative and thus the second-order
condition holds. QED4
4.3. Minimum Participation Rules
The rule m says that no subgroup of size less than m can integrate alone. Such
a rule may appear odd when there are positive externalities from those who are
participating, particularly if the heterogeneity is large such that some members
4In the proof, I assumed that mh −e>0. However, even if this were not the case, it is easy
to show that m<1 is optimal.
18will beneﬁt a lot if they integrate. However, by requiring m to participate, these
members realize that they cannot free-ride and that they are pivotal for any
integration to proceed. This mitigates the free-rider problem, suggesting that
m should be positive when externalities are positive and large, as were the case
for the Kyoto protocol of climate gas reductions. However, a large heterogeneity
means that even when less than m approves, some members may beneﬁtal o t ,
and these should be allowed to contribute. Thus, if the heterogeneity is large,
m should be small. The following proposition shows that this intuition is correct
indeed.
Proposition 8: It is optimal that m > 0 if h<e+ q, i.e. if the heterogeneity is
small and the externalities large.











The ﬁrst term is zero, while the second and the third can be calculated to be,
respectively,
mq[q + me − 3mq/2] and
−m(mh/2+( 1− m)q)(h − e).
T h es u mo ft h et e r m sa r ep o s i t i v ei f
q[q + e − h] − m
¡
3q
2 − h(2q + e − h)
¢
/2 > 0.
Clearly, if m is small, the expression holds if q(q + e − h) > 0.5 QED
5If
¡
3q2 − h(2q + e − h)
¢
/2 > 0, the second-order condition would hold and the optimal m
will be interior. It is then easy to see that the optimal m increases in e.
195. The EU Treaty, Reviewed
The future of European Integration is ﬁercely debated. After some of the member
states have rejected what other regarded as the next European Constitution, the
question is whether a subgroup of the members should be allowed to go further
than others. This is the idea of ﬂexible integration (Dewatripont et al., 1995).
This question motivated the analysis of this paper. Currently, the Treaty of the
European Union does allow enhanced cooperation between a subset of the member
states, under certain conditions. It should, according to Article 43 (j), be open
to all members, should they wish to participate. Moreover, Article 43 (f) states
that enhanced cooperation must "not constitute a barrier to or discrimination
in trade", and it should, according to Article 43 (h), "respect the competences,
rights and obligations of those Member States which do not participate therein".
For this reason, the externalities may be believed to be positive.
A simple model is presented where ﬂexibility and rigidity can be compared.
Flexibility, it turned out, is better than rigidity if the heterogeneity is large and
the externality small. Since enlargement of the union is likely to increase hetero-
geneity, a larger union should allow for more ﬂexibility. Such ﬂexibility must be
committed to in advance, however, since after the heterogeneity between the mem-
ber states has materialized, a majority of the countries tend to support rigidity
too often compared to what is optimal.
T h ee x t e n s i v eu s eo fq u a l i ﬁed majority voting in the EU makes it possible
for a suﬃciently large majority to impose participation on the other members,
even if Article 43 would allow them to cooperate alone. Such a "mandatory
participation rule" combines aspects of ﬂexible and rigid cooperation, and it is
20better than both, the analysis shows. Moreover, this majority requirement should
indeed be a super-majority, exactly as practiced in the EU. This qualiﬁed majority
rule should, according to the analysis, increase in the heterogeneity but decrease in
the externality. After the heterogeneity between the members is realized, however,
the majority of countries prefer a simple majority rule, thus imposing mandatory
participation too often compared to what is optimal. Again, the constitutional
rules should be determined behind the veil of ignorance to avoid excessive rigidity.
As one of the requirements for enhanced cooperation, Article 43 (g) states
that at least eight members have to participate. Such minimum participation
rules are also common for environmental agreements, where the externality is
often large. The minimum participation rule may mitigate free-rider problems,
the analysis shows, but the optimal threshold varies from policy to policy. In
particular, the threshold should be larger if the externality is large, but smaller
if the heterogeneity is large. When the heterogeneity between the countries is
realized, however, there may exist no minimum
6. Concluding Remarks
The analysis in this paper shows that ﬂexible cooperation is better than the rigid
one-size-ﬁts-all approach if the externality is small and the heterogeneity large.
Both regimes, however, are special cases of the combination of mandatory and
minimum participation rules which, together, implement any monotonic and sym-
metric participation mechanism. If the heterogeneity increases, the mandatory
participation rule should increase while the minimum participation rule should
decrease, thus allowing for more ﬂexibility. If the externality increases, however,
21the mandatory participation rule should decrease while the minimum participation
rule should increase, thereby mitigating the free-rider problem.
Although the model is motivated by the European Union, it can be applied to
many other contexts. Should the labor standards in a ﬁrm, for example, be applied
to union-members or to everyone? How does the answer to this question depend
on the number of employees that are members of the union? Or, to take another
example: Should representatives of a political party vote according to the party’s
majority decision, and which majority threshold should be used to decide upon
this? By introspection, these questions raise dilemmas similar to those analyzed
above, although the model may need to be modiﬁed. Thus, alternative contexts
should motivate extending the model in future research.
Technically, the analysis stopped short of pointing out any possible interac-
tion between mandatory and minimum participation rules. If the two thresholds
were close, such that the number of participants were never strictly between them,
then the optimal thresholds should be jointly determined, not separately as done
above. Furthermore, since the above participation mechanism is unable to induce
the ﬁrst-best number of participants, future research should analyze other insti-
tutional details (more general mechanisms) that could improve upon mandatory
and minimum participation rules.
.
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